State Sovereignty on Trial

The debate over the scope of judicial power in the early years of the United States was an extension of the fundamental struggle over the balance between federal and state authority. When the framers drafted the Constitution, they envisioned a strong federal judiciary, but they also had to contend with concerns that this new branch of government would encroach upon state sovereignty. The ratification debates of the late 1780s were filled with arguments about the extent of judicial authority, particularly regarding whether the federal courts could hear cases against states brought by private citizens. Many Federalists, including Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers, argued that states would not be subject to lawsuits by individuals without their consent, emphasizing that a sovereign entity could not be compelled into court like an ordinary litigant. On the other hand, Anti-Federalists feared that Article III, Section 2, which extended federal judicial power to “controversies between a state and citizens of another state,” opened the door to an unprecedented judicial intrusion into state affairs.

The issue remained largely theoretical until Chisholm v. Georgia in 1793. This case arose from an unpaid debt incurred by the state of Georgia during the Revolutionary War. In 1777, Georgia had authorized the purchase of goods from a South Carolina merchant, Robert Farquhar, but never settled the debt. After Farquhar’s death, his executor, Alexander Chisholm, attempted to recover the funds by suing the state in the U.S. Supreme Court. Georgia refused to appear in court, arguing that as a sovereign state, it could not be sued without its consent. The Court, in a 4–1 decision, ruled in favor of Chisholm, holding that under Article III, Section 2, federal courts had jurisdiction over cases between a state and citizens of another state, even when the state was the defendant.

The ruling sent shockwaves through the states. For many, the idea that a state could be compelled into court against its will was a violation of sovereignty. The reaction was swift and overwhelming. State legislatures condemned the decision, viewing it as a dangerous expansion of federal judicial power that threatened the delicate balance between state and federal authority. The fear was not merely theoretical—many states were deeply in debt following the war, and Chisholm raised concerns that they could be inundated with lawsuits from creditors. Even Massachusetts, a state generally aligned with Federalist principles, saw its legislature take immediate action, with Governor John Hancock delivering a speech just before his death warning against the dangers of state suability.

The Eleventh Amendment was proposed in response to this crisis. Introduced in Congress in 1794, the amendment was designed to explicitly overturn Chisholm and restore the understanding of state immunity that Federalists had promised during the ratification debates. The text of the amendment reads: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” The language was crafted carefully to ensure that no future interpretation of Article III could be used to subject states to lawsuits against their will.

The amendment moved rapidly through the legislative process. It was passed by the Senate on January 14, 1794, and by the House of Representatives on March 4, 1794. The states ratified it with remarkable speed—North Carolina became the twelfth state to approve it on February 7, 1795, fulfilling the constitutional requirement for adoption. Even South Carolina, which had been directly affected by Chisholm, did not ratify until 1797, but by then the amendment was already in effect. President John Adams, in a message to Congress in 1798, formally acknowledged its adoption.

The immediate impact of the Eleventh Amendment was profound. The Supreme Court, recognizing the amendment’s authority, dismissed all pending suits brought under Chisholm. The decision in Hollingsworth v. Virginia (1798) reinforced the amendment’s reach, ensuring that states could no longer be sued by private citizens from another state in federal court. This effectively ended any attempt to use federal courts as a venue for resolving financial claims against states.

Over time, the scope of the Eleventh Amendment has evolved, with the courts expanding its interpretation beyond its original text. In Hans v. Louisiana (1890), the Supreme Court held that the amendment barred not just suits by citizens of other states, but also suits brought by a state’s own citizens. This decision established the principle that sovereign immunity was a fundamental aspect of statehood, rooted in the Constitution itself rather than merely in the amendment. Later cases, such as Alden v. Maine (1999), extended this doctrine to protect states from suits even in their own courts, reinforcing the idea that sovereign immunity is a structural principle of the Constitution.

Modern interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment have led to debates over the extent of congressional power to abrogate state immunity. In Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996), the Court held that Congress could not use its Article I powers to override state immunity, further entrenching the amendment’s protections. However, exceptions have emerged, particularly under the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer (1976), the Court ruled that Congress could override state immunity when legislating under its power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments, which were explicitly designed to curb state authority in the aftermath of the Civil War.

The Eleventh Amendment, born from the backlash against Chisholm v. Georgia, remains a cornerstone of American federalism. It reflects the enduring tension between state sovereignty and federal authority, a conflict that has shaped American constitutional law for over two centuries. While the amendment was originally a narrow correction to a specific judicial ruling, its legacy has grown into a broader principle of state immunity, affecting everything from civil rights litigation to financial obligations. The Founders may not have anticipated the full breadth of its modern application, but in their time, it was a necessary response to a perceived judicial overreach, a reminder that the balance of power in America has always been a work in progress.