The McCollum Memo. You might not know the name off the top of your head, but once we dig into it, I think you’ll find this one fascinating. It’s a key piece of a puzzle that explains a lot about America’s entry into World War II—and why some folks believe FDR might have known more about Pearl Harbor than he ever let on.
Let’s start with some background. By 1940, the world was already on fire. Nazi Germany had gobbled up most of Europe, and Japan was tearing through Asia like nobody’s business. Here at home, though, the U.S. was doing its best to stay out of it. Isolationism was still pretty popular—especially among conservatives. Sure, we were sending some aid to Britain and China, but nobody wanted another world war. At least, not on paper.
But, quietly, behind the scenes, certain folks in the military and intelligence community were starting to think, “Hey, we’re going to have to deal with Japan sooner or later.” One of those people was Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum, a Naval Intelligence officer. This guy was deep into the nitty-gritty of U.S.-Japan relations, and he’d been watching Japan’s aggressive moves closely.
So, on October 7, 1940, McCollum drafted a memo—known today as the “McCollum Memo”—that laid out a bold plan. His idea was simple: provoke Japan into attacking the U.S. That’s right. He wasn’t just predicting conflict—he was offering a roadmap for how the U.S. could practically force Japan into striking first.
McCollum’s memo outlined an eight-point strategy designed to put the squeeze on Japan. Each action was meant to increase tensions, provoke anger, and ultimately push Japan to the breaking point. He recommended things like strengthening U.S. military bases in the Pacific, cutting off Japan’s oil supply, building up alliances with Britain and the Dutch in the Pacific, and helping China fight back against Japan’s invasion.
It was a calculated move. McCollum believed that Japan wouldn’t sit back if the U.S. started implementing these steps. And he was probably right. If you look at history, you can see how each of these actions—whether deliberate or not—put Japan in a tight spot. By the time Pearl Harbor happened in December 1941, Japan had few other options but to strike first.
Now, here’s where things get interesting. There’s no hard proof that President Franklin D. Roosevelt ever saw the McCollum Memo. No smoking gun, no document with FDR’s signature saying, “Let’s do this.” But here’s the thing: a lot of McCollum’s recommendations eventually became U.S. policy. Embargoes were slapped on Japan, the U.S. Pacific fleet was bolstered, and the Philippines got reinforced.
Was this just a coincidence? Maybe. Or maybe McCollum’s ideas were filtering up the chain of command and FDR, knowingly or unknowingly, followed the playbook.
For years, historians have debated whether Roosevelt actively wanted to get the U.S. into the war and saw Japan as the way to make that happen. After all, Europe was falling apart, and the U.S. needed to be involved if it wanted a say in the post-war world. But selling another war to a nation still scarred from World War I? Not an easy task.
Once Pearl Harbor happened, it didn’t take long for conspiracy theories to sprout. Some people—then and now—believe that FDR had seen McCollum’s memo, or at least understood the consequences of U.S. actions in the Pacific. They argue that Roosevelt may have wanted Japan to attack first, so the American people, outraged by a sneak attack, would rally behind a declaration of war. And guess what? That’s exactly what happened.
In the years since, these theories have only grown. Some argue that Pearl Harbor was “allowed” to happen, though most historians dismiss this as conspiracy talk. But here’s the bottom line: the U.S. was taking steps that it knew would make Japan angry. Whether FDR explicitly planned it that way or not, the actions outlined in McCollum’s memo played a role in leading up to the attack.
Whether McCollum’s memo was a blueprint or just one man’s suggestion, it was part of a broader strategy that eventually drew the U.S. into World War II. The steps laid out in the memo lined up closely with the escalating tensions between the U.S. and Japan. By cutting off Japan’s access to critical resources and fortifying military positions in the Pacific, the U.S. was, intentionally or not, cornering Japan. And when Japan felt trapped, it lashed out—just like McCollum had predicted.
Today, the McCollum Memo remains a controversial part of World War II history. It’s not widely known, but those who do know about it see it as a critical piece of the puzzle. Did it directly lead to Pearl Harbor? That’s up for debate. But there’s no denying that McCollum saw the writing on the wall—and his recommendations aligned almost perfectly with how things played out.
The bigger question is whether FDR saw this coming and whether he might’ve been willing to let things escalate for the sake of getting the U.S. into the war. It’s the kind of thing that makes you wonder what’s really happening behind the scenes in government decision-making, isn’t it?
In the end, the McCollum Memo is a reminder that history often has more layers than we think. It’s not just about the events we see on the surface—it’s about the strategies, memos, and decisions made in back rooms long before the first shot is fired. As we dig deeper into history, we can see how even the smallest memo can shape the course of world events.
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