The American Civil War often evokes names like Gettysburg, Shiloh, or Antietam—iconic, blood-soaked fields in the East. But if one looks westward, into the rugged folds of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains in New Mexico, there lies another battlefield where destiny turned: Glorieta Pass. Fought from March 26 to 28, 1862, this little-known clash became the hinge on which Confederate dreams of a Western empire swung—and snapped.
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By early 1862, the Confederate leadership saw opportunity in the vast, sparsely populated Southwest. The South’s grand design, championed by Brigadier General Henry Hopkins Sibley, was bold, ambitious, and just a touch fantastical. The idea was to send an army from Texas, up the Rio Grande, through New Mexico, and into Colorado to seize the gold fields. From there, the Confederates would march west, hoping to capture the seaports of Los Angeles and San Diego. If they succeeded, they would open new trade routes to the Pacific, bypass the Union blockade, and gain access to wealth and strategic depth. Some Confederate leaders even had their eyes on the Mexican states of Chihuahua and Sonora.
Sibley, a former U.S. Army officer with a reputation for heavy drinking and dreamy ambition, received approval for his plan from Confederate President Jefferson Davis. With that, he raised the “Army of New Mexico”—a mounted brigade mostly composed of Texas volunteers, including the 4th, 5th, and 7th Texas Mounted Rifles. Many of the officers were veterans of the Mexican-American War or frontier campaigns. Though spirited, Sibley’s force lacked the logistics to support a long march through arid terrain. His strategy depended entirely on capturing Union supply depots along the way.
In February 1862, Sibley’s army won a tactical victory at the Battle of Valverde, forcing Union Colonel Edward Canby’s forces back into Fort Craig. But Sibley could not take the fort itself—it was too heavily defended, and he lacked the siege artillery needed to reduce it. Instead, he left Canby behind and pressed northward, capturing Albuquerque and Santa Fe. Though the Confederate flag flew briefly over those towns, the supplies he sought had already been moved north to Fort Union. That fort, near the Colorado border, became his new objective.
Meanwhile, the Union response was gathering strength. Canby remained at Fort Craig, but reinforcements from Colorado were on the move. Colonel John P. Slough led the 1st Colorado Infantry—frontiersmen, miners, and volunteers—on a punishing 400-mile march from Denver to Fort Union in just 14 days. Accompanying him was Major John Chivington, a fiery and aggressive former minister who commanded a portion of the force. Slough took it upon himself to push forward from Fort Union, hoping to engage the Confederate vanguard before it could threaten the supply depot.
The two forces collided in Apache Canyon on March 26. Confederate Major Charles L. Pyron had stationed about 300 men at the western end of Glorieta Pass, supported by pickets along the trail. Chivington, with a slightly larger force, surprised the Confederate pickets and routed Pyron’s men after a sharp fight. The Confederates fell back to Johnson’s Ranch, just east of the pass, while Chivington withdrew to await reinforcements.
Both sides spent March 27 regrouping and receiving additional troops. For the Confederates, Lieutenant Colonel William R. Scurry arrived with reinforcements and took overall command. By March 28, Scurry had about 1,100 men, including dismounted cavalry and five cannons. Slough’s Union force numbered around 1,300 and included the 1st Colorado Infantry, some U.S. regulars, and New Mexico volunteers.
On the morning of March 28, 1862, Slough attempted a two-pronged plan. He led the main Union force into the pass to confront the Confederates head-on, while sending Chivington with around 500 men over Glorieta Mesa to flank the enemy from behind. Slough assumed the Confederates would remain near Apache Canyon, but Scurry advanced more quickly than expected, meeting Slough’s force near Pigeon’s Ranch.
There, in the narrow defile of the Santa Fe Trail, battle erupted. Scurry’s Texans attacked in three prongs, and despite terrain difficulties, they pushed the Union line back toward the eastern mouth of the pass. The fighting was intense, close-quarters, and chaotic. Union artillery kept the center from breaking, but the Texans, many of whom were experienced and tenacious fighters, nearly carried the day.
But the real blow came from behind. As the main fight raged, Chivington’s detachment reached Johnson’s Ranch and discovered the Confederate supply train. They burned 80 wagons, killed or drove off hundreds of horses and mules, and destroyed food, ammunition, and medical stores. The destruction was total.
Though the Confederates held the field at the end of the day and could claim a tactical victory, it was meaningless. Deprived of supplies and transport, Scurry’s men had no choice but to retreat. Sibley’s grand campaign unraveled as the Confederate army limped back through the mountains toward Texas. Fewer than half of the original force made it home.
The battle’s outcome sparked debate, particularly around Chivington’s role. Some saw him as a hero who struck the decisive blow, while others pointed to his later actions at Sand Creek as evidence of a darker legacy. Regardless, his flanking maneuver shattered the Confederate campaign.
Glorieta Pass marked the end of Confederate aspirations in the Southwest. The invasion had been a bold gamble, but the terrain, the logistics, and the tenacity of Union forces made it untenable. Never again would Confederate troops seriously threaten Colorado, California, or the territories beyond. The Union retained control of New Mexico and protected the mineral wealth of the West—wealth that would help fund the Northern war effort.
While the fields of Pennsylvania and Virginia get most of the glory, Glorieta Pass reminds us that the Civil War’s reach extended to the high mesas and narrow canyons of the far West. It was there, among the piñon and ponderosa, that one of the South’s most ambitious dreams went up in smoke.
Wilson, Spencer, and Robert A. Bieberman. The Civil War in New Mexico: Tall Tales and True. New Mexico Geological Society, 34th Annual Fall Field Conference Guidebook, 1983, pp. 85–88.
National Park Service. Battle of Glorieta Pass – Pecos National Historical Park. U.S. Department of the Interior,
https://www.nps.gov/peco/learn/historyculture/index.htm.
Wikipedia contributors. Battle of Glorieta Pass. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Glorieta_Pass.
Kelly-Fischer, Patrick. “Gettysburg of the West?: The Battle of Glorieta Pass.” Emerging Civil War, March 26, 2022,
https://emergingcivilwar.com/2022/03/26/gettysburg-of-the-west-the-battle-of-glorieta-pass/.
Pahre, Robert. Interpretation of a Decisive Civil War Battle Evolves. Western National Parks Association, February 28, 2022,
https://wnpa.org/interpretation-of-a-decisive-civil-war-battle-evolves.
Wikipedia contributors. New Mexico Campaign. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Mexico_campaign.
American Battlefield Trust. The Battle of Glorieta. https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/battle-glorieta.
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